RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: SOME PROBLEMS FOR
ORIGINALISTS (AND EVERYONE ELSE, TOO)
*

Barry Friedman

I. INTRODUCTION
In its 2000 decision in United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court
held that the Congress of the United States lacks legislative power to
1
provide a remedy in the federal courts for gender-based violence.
The reasoning of the Court was straightforward. Congress could not
adopt the bill as an exercise of its enumerated commerce power because “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not . . . economic
activity,” and thus do not “substantially affect[] interstate com2
merce.” This economic-noneconomic line was necessary because
“[t]he Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly na3
tional and what is truly local.” Nor was the law valid under the Fourteenth Amendment. Assuredly it was the case that “state-sponsored
4
gender discrimination violates equal protection,” and Congress
plainly possessed power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to “‘enforce,’ by ‘appropriate legislation’ the constitutional
5
guarantee” of equality. Yet, again, there were necessary limitations
on such power, most notably the one found in the 1883 Civil Rights
Cases, which held that Congress lacked power under Section 5 to re6
gulate private rather than state actors. The public-private line was
required (this should start to sound familiar) “to prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from obliterating the Framers’ carefully crafted
7
balance of power between the States and the National Government.”
Congress’s remedy against gender-motivated violence failed because
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it “visit[ed] no consequence whatever on any [state] . . . official.”
The Court conceded that if the allegations of gender-motivated violence in the case were true—and they were hardly atypical ones—“no
9
civilized system of justice could fail to provide . . . a remedy.”
“[U]nder our federal system,” however, that “remedy must be pro10
vided by [the states], and not by the United States.”
The popular and academic reaction to Morrison was all over the
map. Conservatives generally were happy—but not all of them, since
11
some had supported the legislation invalidated by the Court. Many
12
liberals were hyperbolic, displaying deep anger with the decision.
Still, some liberal voices agreed with the Court, or thought that the
13
decision was not unwarranted. Given subsequent events, notably the
trimming of the Rehnquist Court’s federalism initiative, the result in
Morrison may not seem to matter much. But the bases for the Court’s
ruling—its reaffirmation of the Civil Rights Cases, and the limited
conception of congressional power—have the potential to reverberate.
Rather than entering the already-crowded field on whether the
Morrison Court decided the case correctly, what I seek to do here instead is highlight the potentially enormous complexity involved in
answering the question. Following the Court’s decision, commenta-
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Id. at 626.
Id. at 627.
Id.
See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Why You Can’t Sue Your Rapist in Federal Court, NAT’L J., May 20, 2000,
at 1577 (“The Framers clearly did not intend to let Congress regulate everything. And if
rape and domestic violence have a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to justify federal regulation, then so does all violent crime, and so do most other human activities.”).
But a few Republican senators expressed frustration with the Morrison decision. See, e.g.,
Linda Greenhouse, The Court v. Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at A1 (quoting Senator Arlen Specter as declaring that he took “umbrage at what the court has said,” particularly in Morrison).
See, e.g., Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 83 (2001)
(concluding that the Court, in invalidating federal legislation like the statute at issue in
Morrison, is “using its authority to diminish the proper role of Congress”); Herman
Schwartz, Assault on Federalism Swipes at Women, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 2000, at M1 (calling
Morrison “another salvo” in the Supreme Court’s “jihad against the federal government”);
Cass R. Sunstein, Tilting the Scales Rightward, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2001, at A23 (noting the
“remarkable period of right-wing judicial activism”).
See, e.g., Neal Devins, The Federalism-Rights Nexus: Explaining Why Senate Democrats Can Tolerate Rehnquist Court Decision Making but not the Rehnquist Court, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1307,
1315–16 (2002) (noting that most of the Rehnquist Court federalism decisions “have
been narrow in scope”); Editorial, States’ Business, WASH. POST, May 16, 2000, at A20 (asserting that “in this one, the court got it right. If Congress could federalize rape and assault, it’s hard to think of anything it couldn’t.”); Anthony Lewis, Court and Congress, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 2000, at A15 (admitting that Morrison was a “close case”).
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tors questioned whether the Court’s conception of American federalism was correct, and whether violence against women was properly
characterized as a private act, rather than a failure of state remedial
14
schemes. But there are even more profound and difficult questions
that arise if one takes seriously the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment, both at its inception and thereafter. Virtually none of
this complexity was evident on the face of the Court’s opinion, and
much of it was missing from the debate that occurred in its aftermath.
What, after all, explains the Court’s blithe (and longstanding) assumption that women’s equality is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment in the first place? In her days as an activist for women’s
equality, Ruth Bader Ginsburg conceded that those who adopted the
Fourteenth Amendment had intentionally put to one side the issue of
15
gender equality in favor of more pressing concerns over race. Yet,
as is familiar to all, in the 1970s the Court—assisted by Ginsburg-aslitigator—extended the heightened protections of the Equal Protec16
tion Clause to women. How precisely did the Constitution change
17
in this way? Similarly, although there has been a robust debate both
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See Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court’s Assault on Democracy and
Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 380–83 (2002) (noting the extent of Congress’s findings on state failures to address domestic violence and criticizing the Court’s approach as
a “radical new understanding of congressional power”); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Law after Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE
L.J. 441, 445–46 (2000) (arguing that Morrison, along with Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,
528 U.S. 62 (2000), marked a retreat from the antidiscrimination jurisprudence that had
developed in the four decades since Brown v. Board of Education).
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Jane Picker, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Discussion at
The Ford Foundation 12 (May 22, 1972) (transcript available in the New York University
Law School Library).
See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (applying heightened scrutiny to a state beer
law that discriminated between young men and young women); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (striking down a discriminatory military benefits regulation on the basis of heightened scrutiny); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971) (claiming to use rational basis scrutiny, while striking down an estate law that discriminated between male and female heirs).
For discussion of rationales for expanding the Equal Protection Clause’s scope, see Reva
B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family,
115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 948–49 (2002) (noting that the Supreme Court has incorporated
sex discrimination into its Equal Protection jurisprudence by analogizing sex to race, rather than recognizing sex discrimination protections as rooted in the constitutional text).
See also Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951 (2002) (arguing
that the constitutional text—specifically the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments—
should provide guidance in determining the forms of discrimination barred by the Equal
Protection Clause); David A. Strauss, The New Textualism in Constitutional Law, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1153, 1154–56 (1998) (asserting that the rise in constitutional sex dis-
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on and off the Court regarding the proper application of federalist
principles in Section 5 and Commerce Clause cases alike, virtually
none of this discussion has acknowledged how understandings of federalism have seesawed throughout American history. Opponents of
the Morrison majority’s view of American federalism typically stress the
18
transformational effect of the Civil War Amendments. Yet, they pay
almost no attention to the fact that the nation quickly turned its back
on those amendments, motivated in part by a reluctance to substantially abandon antebellum understandings of the American federal
structure. Does the swift de facto reversal of Reconstruction count
for nothing? And if so, why? Is it because those post-Reconstruction
understandings themselves were erased by the subsequent events of
1937? Or was the determinative factor the rediscovery of racial equality in the 1950s and 1960s? How, in short, ought a constitutional interpreter deal with these profound swings in constitutional meaning,
recorded in constitutional doctrine and history, but not in constitutional text? Should they count for naught?
This Article addresses the difficult task any constitutional interpreter inevitably faces once she determines to take the entire document into account, not just a part of it. That problem is exacerbated
enormously because the Constitution was enacted over time and not all
at one time. Both of these problems—holistic interpretation and
construction over time—are illuminated by focusing on the meaning
of the Constitution in light of the Civil War Amendments.
A central, though hardly exclusive, target of this Article is the possibility and the sincerity of originalist interpretation. The last thirty
to forty years have seen a crescendo of support, at least in some quarters, for construing the Constitution in light of its “original under19
standing.” Obviously, if originalism is the proper methodology for

18

19

crimination protections without a formal amendment reflects the relative unimportance
of constitutional text).
See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1259 (2001) (questioning why the Fourteenth Amendment is
seen as modifying the Eleventh Amendment but not Congress’s Article I Commerce
Clause powers); Siegel, supra note 17, at 997–1003, 1039–44 (discussing how discrimination against women has often been justified by federalism concerns, and suggesting that
the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments together provide for expanded national authority to combat sex discrimination).
See generally, ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990) (providing an overview
of the politicization of the Supreme Court and the competing theories and interests that
judges take into account when making their decisions, and concluding that a successful
theory of interpretation cannot depart from the original meaning of the Constitution);
Steven G. Calabresi, Introduction to ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 1–40
(Steven G. Calabresi ed. 2007) (describing the debate over originalism and concluding
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constitutional interpretation, then this methodology must be applied
to all parts of the Constitution. In deciding cases like Morrison, the
Court rightfully looked back to the Founding of the nation in 1787.
But it also must take full account of Reconstruction, the nation’s Second Founding, and the time when the Fourteenth Amendment itself
was adopted. As a nation and a constitutional culture, we wallow
deep in the waters of the Founding era. Yet, the rich history of the
Civil War Amendments has barely been integrated into our national
ethos. This is perfectly understandable. The period is historically
rich and deeply complicated; there are no easy stories there. But it
also is unfortunate. One cannot talk about interpreting the Constitution without considering what it means to interpret it all together,
across text and across time. This sort of interpretation will prove
tricky for everyone, but especially for originalists.
I begin by sketching the odd neglect of the Reconstruction
Amendments as a matter of constitutional interpretation and interpretive methodology both. Then, in what is the heart of the Article, I
detail five specific problems that repairing this neglect pose for any
interpretive theory (but particularly originalism). First, there is the
problem of interpretation. For a variety of reasons I detail, developing an original understanding of the Constitution of 1787 is a snap
compared to making sense of the Second Founding. Second is the
problem of integration: how does one render a coherent interpretation of a Constitution that has clauses layered atop others over time,
clauses that sometimes trump earlier ones, but more often simply
modify them in elusive ways? Third is the problem of rejection. By
the early 1880s the country largely had turned its back on the work of
the Reconstruction Congress. Chattel slavery had ended, but in many
places that was about it. What does one do with constitutional provisions that fall into desuetude? Fourth, there is the problem of revision: as the country turned its back on the original commitments of
the Civil War Amendments, the courts found altogether new meanings in the clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, interpretations
largely constructed to protect the interests of property holders and
interstate businesses. These interpretations, arguably quite different
from the original understanding of the Reconstruction Amendments,
were dominant for almost half a century. Can longstanding revision-

originalist constitutional interpretation is the most effective way to interpret the Constitution); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999) (explaining why originalism is the prevailing form of constitutional interpretation); John O.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 917 (2008) (arguing that originalism produces desirable results).
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ist understandings themselves become embedded in the Constitution? And what happens if then, over time, they too are rejected?
Fifth, there is the question of recovery. Beginning in the twentieth
century, renewed concern about civil rights led to a rebirth of attention to the original commitments of the Civil War Amendments. Can
rejected original understandings be reborn, and if so, how should
they then be understood—in the terms of their original naissance, or
their renaissance?
As I believe will become apparent, these problems, taken together,
are somewhat devastating for a purely originalist methodology. Yet,
importantly, they do not make life comfortable for any theory of interpretation. It is commonplace (and perfectly understandable) for
constitutional interpreters of all stripes to seek consistency, to try to
set a straight course between ratification and the present. As the
checkered history of the Reconstruction Amendments demonstrates,
however, in reality there has been much tacking to and fro. How
does one interpret the Constitution coherently given this varied
course?
In closing, I will argue that constitutional interpreters necessarily
have to engage in synthesis. Any serious interpreter of the Constitution has to have something sensible to say about the back and forth of
constitutional meaning throughout history. One cannot simply ignore tidal changes in the interpretation of the Constitution. I will
make the point that as lawyers, when we synthesize, we do so looking
backward, not forward. Perhaps it is inevitable that backward synthesis involves the drawing of straight lines, even if they are not true to
history. If this is so, then constitutional interpretation is not so much
an exercise in reconstructing our past, as in tracing our way back to it
as best we can. Still, there are better and less acceptable means of doing so.
History is empiricism of a sort, and a useful analogy might be an
empirical one. When assessing claims of cause and effect, empiricists
use regression analysis. They take a set of data points and do the best
job they can fitting a straight line to it. Some points lie right on the
line, some far above or below it, but the best line is one that minimizes the overall deviation from the data that exists. The line, in this
sense, is not some fictitious straight line from a foundational moment
that determines the present. Rather, it is an understanding of the
present that provides the best account of all the points in the past.
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II. THE UNFORTUNATE NEGLECT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION
AMENDMENTS
Reconstruction, America’s Second Founding, remains curiously
neglected as a subject of constitutional exploration. Even assuming
any serious theory of constitutional interpretation can pick and
choose the clauses it wishes to consider, it is difficult to see how that
choice reasonably could fail to include the Civil War Amendments.
Yet, for those engaged in the endeavor of original understanding—as
well as for most other methods of constitutional interpretation—
those amendments remain a bit of a frontier, relatively unexplored
and little understood.
Although making this claim involves the always-perilous task of
proving a negative, one doubts the point is likely to elicit a serious
challenge. This is not an assertion that the Civil War Amendments
themselves have not played a sufficient role in American constitutionalism. Obviously the Fourteenth Amendment alone has been
deeply significant to constitutional law at least since the 1880s (albeit
with its high and low points). Nor is it necessarily that there is a
dearth of scholarship regarding Reconstruction. There has been a
great deal of good work done on what happened in the late 1860s
20
and what the nation expected out of the Civil War Amendments.
Rather, the claim is that Reconstruction has inadequately influenced
the direction of constitutional law itself, particularly as compared
with the original founding. Constitutional doctrine imperfectly un21
derstands Reconstruction.
20

See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE
DOCTRINE 42–45 (1988) (detailing the political climate and goals during the
proposal and adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863,
864 (1986) (analyzing “the Republican theory of national civil rights enforcement authority under the thirteenth amendment, which the Civil Rights Act was intended to implement, and the fourteenth amendment. . . . [and finding that] the Supreme Court ultimately rejected the interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and Reconstruction
amendments suggested by the Republican theory of civil rights enforcement”).
Fairness requires conceding that original understandings of the Founding may not really
have influenced constitutional law significantly either. Talk of the originalist methodology is abundant. Conferences are held, and articles and books written, imploring courts
to be originalist (or exploring the pitfalls of originalism). Sometimes it seems there is far
more attention to the question of whether original understandings ought to be pursued,
rather than attention to actually pursuing them. As Robert Post and Reva Siegel explain
it, originalism is a political movement, an ideology, much more than an attention to interpretive understanding. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The
Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006). Still, there is no denying some
broader attention in Supreme Court decisions to original meanings of the Founding era.
See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
TO JUDICIAL

21
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Although it is difficult to establish conclusively a relative lack of attention to understandings of the Civil War Amendments, there are
some significant data points. Take the Supreme Court, where the
strategy with regard to interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment at
critical moments has been one akin to confession and avoidance.
Did those who adopted the Equal Protection Clause intend to prohibit racial discrimination in schools? The Court found no meaningful answer in the history (or perhaps not the one it wanted), so it
quickly moved on to other reasons why such discrimination was
22
unlawful. Similarly, did the Privileges or Immunities Clause, or the
Due Process Clause, incorporate the provisions of the existing Bill of
Rights? The history appeared indeterminate (or problematic), so the
Court went its own way and adopted the approach of selective incor23
poration. As serious works of scholarship have made clear, the history of the Fourteenth Amendment actually had a lot to say about
each of these questions, albeit not in the terms the Court was willing
24
to hear. So, that inconvenient history was simply cast to one side.
In the public realm, the relative deficit of attention to Reconstruction is even more telling. A trip to the bookstore reveals a country
practically awash in the original founding; biographies and histories
for the popular educated reader abound. In comparison, Reconstruction is a diaspora, and the Gilded Age that followed lost almost
entirely. In the popular mind, American history seems to run
through Lincoln straight to Theodore Roosevelt, if not his cousin
Franklin.
Remarkably, the same unfortunate neglect seems pervasive among
those who would interpret the Constitution using an originalist methodology. The present obsession in some quarters with originalism
can be traced back to the rise of conservativism in the 1970s and

22

23

24

The Court in Brown v. Board of Education acknowledged that reargument had focused on
the circumstances surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption, but explicitly refused to “turn the clock back.” 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954). For a historical argument that
Brown actually was consistent with the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV.
947 (1995). For a critique, see Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional
Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995).
See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 54 (1947) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment could not automatically incorporate the original Bill of Rights since “[n]othing has
been called to [the Court’s] attention that either the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment or the states that adopted intended its due process clause to draw within its scope
the earlier amendments to the Constitution”).
See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 215–18
(1998) (arguing that the issue of incorporation is complicated by basic differences in how
the original Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment are structured).
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25

1980s. Yet, since that time originalists—with a few notable exceptions such as John Harrison, Akhil Amar (really a textualist), Michael
McConnell, and Randy Barnett—have devoted little if any attention
26
to the Second Founding.
Though it is easy to see why Reconstruction has been neglected—
more on this in a moment—the impact of doing so should be readily
apparent. The period after the Civil War involved telling debates
about one of America’s deepest commitments: equality. The very
conception of citizenship, of political and civil existence in the American polity, was detailed and discussed at great length. There were
intricate analyses of what rights state and national citizens possessed.
The country watched closely as Congress debated legislative and constitutional measures, voter turnout was high, and elections were
fought and won (or lost) on the perceived justice (or injustice) of
27
congressional statutory and constitutional decisions. These issues of
equality, citizenship, and foundational rights have been critical to
American political development over at least the last half century.
The failure to devote the same attention to this founding moment as
has been given to 1787 is almost unimaginable.
One perfectly plausible reason for the relative inattention of originalist scholars is that a focus on the Fourteenth Amendment and its
cousins would invigorate the constitutional movement of those on

25

See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION ch.9 (2009) (describing the rise of originalism in the years following the Warren Court); JONATHAN
O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 111–60 (2005) (discussing the revival of originalism led by Raoul Berger in the 1970s and the favored status of originalism
in Edward Meese’s Department of Justice during the 1980s); Post & Siegel, supra note 21,
at 545–46 (2006) (discussing the contributions to originalism of the “pioneer conservative
academics”); see also STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT
135–80 (2008) (providing an overview of the rise of conservatism in law schools).
See generally AMAR, supra note 24 (devoting half of his book to a discussion of Reconstruction); RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY (2004) (discussing how an originalist understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a dramatically expanded reading of the Privileges and Immunities Clause);
John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 375
(2001) [hereinafter Harrison, Lawfulness] (examining the legality of the Reconstruction
Amendments); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE
L.J. 1385, 1460–61 (1992) [hereinafter Harrison, Privileges or Immunities] (analyzing the
Privileges or Immunities Clause in reference to the Reconstruction Amendments);
McConnell, supra note 22 (discussing originalism in the context of desegregation and
thus the Reconstruction Amendments).
See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
427, 456–57 (2007) (referring to the vaguely-worded Amendment as “a new addition to
the Constitution, a campaign proposal for the 1866 elections and an armistice to be imposed on the defeated South”).
THE

26

27
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the political left. Though there are originalist stirrings on the ideological left, in the main the enterprise of original understanding has
been one for conservatives. Yet, the bold themes of Reconstruction,
the equality and rights of American citizens and those within our jurisdictional grasp, certainly resonate most with the left’s agenda. But
do not be too certain that an originalist examination of Reconstruction necessarily or always favors the left. While Reconstruction bespoke a commitment to equality and foundational rights, those conceptions had their limits, most notably in generally excluding women
from the vision, and ultimately in separating civil and political equal28
ity from social equality. While the amount of scholarship tying Reconstruction’s understanding to specific constitutional claims is not
what it should be, some of the extant work is conservative in nature
and makes points that if adopted into doctrine might roll back the
29
scope of existing constitutional protections. There is something in
the original understanding of the Civil War Amendments for scholars
of every ideological stripe.
If we are to interpret the Constitution in light of how it originally
was understood, it seems unavoidable that the devotion to original
understanding must extend to all parts of the Constitution. In the
aftermath of a chilling war, the American Constitution itself experienced a moment of profound re-evaluation and rebirth. Yet, that
moment remains remarkably obscured today.
III. INTERPRETIVE PROBLEMS
A. The Difficulty of Interpretation
The first problem with incorporating Reconstruction into the originalist canon is the sheer difficulty of doing so. Critics of originalism
28

29

See PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 242–48 (4th ed.
2000) (citing legislative history supporting the proposition that the Framers generally did
not intend to protect social rights through the Fourteenth Amendment); Siegel, supra
note 17, at 964–65 (noting that “the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were not terribly interested in enfranchising women”). See generally, Ward Farnsworth, Women Under
Reconstruction: The Congressional Understanding, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1229 (2000) (discussing
how the framers explicitly intended to exclude women’s equality issues from the scope of
the Reconstruction Amendments).
See, e.g., Harrison, Lawfulness, supra note 26, at 375–80 (describing defects in how the Reconstruction Amendments were ratified and concluding that, while the Amendments are
still legally valid, they did not represent popular national sentiment); John Harrison, State
Sovereign Immunity and Congress’s Enforcement Powers, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 353, 399–400 [herinafter Harrison, Sovereign Immunity] (suggesting that Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976), was wrongly decided and that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment should
not limit States’ Eleventh Amendment protections).
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in the context of the original Founding have gone to great lengths to
establish how difficult the task can be. Yet, compared to discerning
the proper construction of the Reconstruction Amendments, the similar search regarding the Founding era is a tea party. Materials are
unavailable, their meaning is obscure; it is unclear that originalist methodologies developed to deal with the Founding are even coherent
when addressed to Reconstruction. None of this excuses the lack of
effort to take full account of Reconstruction, but it does help explain
the failure.
First, it is worth addressing the possibility that the interpretive hierarchy regarding original intent and understanding may need to be
reversed when it comes to Reconstruction. In its initial formulation,
the originalist insistence was upon elucidating the “intentions” of
30
those who framed the Constitution. This idea of original intention
proved elusive for a variety of reasons, including the professed secrecy of the Constitutional Convention, the incoherence of the idea
of collective intent, and the simple impossibility of discovering any
31
germane original intentions as applied to many modern questions.
Thus, as is well known, the idea of “original intention” quickly gave
32
ground to the broader notion of “original understanding.” Today,

30

See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 363–66 (1977) (analyzing the history and importance of “original intention”); Edwin Meese III, U.S. Att’y Gen., Speech Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 47 (Steven G. Calabresi ed. 2007) (advocating that judges adhere to the intentions of the founders);
Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5
(1988) (discussing the evolution of the “jurisprudence of original intent”). For background of the rise and refinement of originalism, see Balkin, supra note 27, at 444–46,
and see Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, (GWU Leg. Studs. Res. Paper No. 393, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1090282.

31

See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204, 214 (1980) (discussing how the founders’ intentions are difficult to ascertain and
aggregate); Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1085, 1087–97 (1989) (summarizing various lines of attack on original intent including the ambiguity of such intent); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 887–88 (1985) (arguing that the Founders themselves
did not expect the Constitution to be interpreted through an originalist lens); Mark
Tushnet, The U.S. Constitution and the Intent of the Framers, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 217, 217–18
(1987) (describing criticisms of the “original intention” method for interpreting the Constitution).

32

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at ch.9 (describing switch to advocacy for jurisprudence of
original understandings); Barnett, supra note 19, at 621 (defining originalim as seeking to
ascertain “the objective original meaning that a reasonable listener would place on the
words used in the constitutional provision at the time of its enactment”).
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the preference for societal understandings over the intentions of the
33
Framers in Philadelphia is almost universal.
Nonetheless, there is a reasonable argument that the move to
original understandings was an error, for the simple reason that original intentions actually are more revealing. The discussions in Philadelphia were a relatively candid affair. By the time the proposed
Constitution hit the street, however, posturing often sullied the debates in ways that make reliance on the original understanding troublesome. Those who opposed the Constitution, the anti-Federalists,
sought to invoke fears about the “consolidation” of the central gov34
ernment vis-à-vis the states. To this end, they often made claims
about the Constitution they happily would abandon once ratification
35
occurred. Similarly, Federalists anxious to quell anti-Federalist worries minimized the import of the Constitution in ways they too would
36
deny in later years. It is unclear that one can set an interpretive
compass by what in the main were often fairly disingenuous or overstated explanations of constitutional meaning.
Second, even assuming the proper focus is on the original understanding of those doing the ratifying, when it comes to Reconstruction the tools for constructing this original understanding are extremely difficult to come by, if not nonexistent. As Larry Kramer has
pointed out, the shift from a focus on intentions to one of original
37
understandings was not driven entirely by theory. Rather, it was
aided by the availability of critical interpretive resources. The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution was published in
33

34

35

36

37

See Barnett, supra note 19, at 620 (declaring that “originalism has itself changed—from
original intention to original meaning. No longer do originalists claim to be seeking the
subjective intentions of the framers”); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 554 (2003) (discussing how original understanding is often
portrayed as being an “objective” interpretive methodology).
See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY 28–29 (2007) (noting that AntiFederalists repeatedly attacked the Constitution’s terms as ambiguous and likely to lead
to overreaching by the federal government); Brutus, Essay No. XII (Feb. 14, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 426–27 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (claiming that the federal courts would expand Congress’s powers so that “the states [will] lose
[their] rights, until they become so trifling and unimportant, as not to be worth having”).
See PURCELL, supra note 34, at 33 (describing how many Anti-Federalists who had criticized the Constitution for granting the central government “unbounded” powers later insisted that the text “was both precise and sharply restrictive”).
For example, Hamilton’s claim that the Necessary and Proper Clause did not provide the
federal government with additional substantive authority—expounded during the ratification debates—soon gave way to a more expansive interpretation of the Clause.
PURCELL, supra note 34, at 32.
Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems with Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 907, 909–
10 (2008).
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1978. “Suddenly,” wrote Kramer, “everybody could be an historian of
ratification, because a vast reserve of primary sources were available
38
in neatly bound volumes.” Now, finally, the tools were at hand with
which to construct an original understanding.
Yet, even today the tools necessary to construct the original of the
Fourteenth Amendment are difficult to obtain if not entirely lacking.
There are the congressional debates over Reconstruction, to be sure,
those seemingly endless and dense discussions that prove frustratingly
difficult to interpret coherently (more on this too in just a moment).
But what of ratification, the process that proves so edifying to originalist scholars of the founding? As the historian James Edward Bond
noted in his 1997 No Easy Walk to Freedom, a discussion of ratification
in the southern states, “[t]here are very few studies of the state ratifi39
cation debates on the Fourteenth Amendment.” This is hardly a
surprise, for—as Michael Kent Curtis explains—“[m]ost of the state
legislatures that considered the Fourteenth Amendment either kept
no record of their debates, or their discussion was so perfunctory that
40
it shed little light on their understanding of its meaning.”
Of
course, one is not limited to formal debates. There are newspaper
chronicles of the views of the people “out-of-doors” as well as political
tracts, campaign speeches, and other relevant sources. But it is an
enormous effort to piece these together, especially given that one
might often need to begin anew as novel interpretive questions presented themselves. It is one thing to be familiar with the entire assembled corpus of legislative debates and apply them to particular issues. It is another to seek out whatever extra-legislative sources
happen to bear upon any given interpretive question.
Third, even if the materials were available to discern the original
understanding of the Reconstruction Amendments, it is not at all
clear they would be enlightening. To describe the congressional debates over the Reconstruction Amendments and accompanying legislation as opaque, intricate, confusing—or tedious for that matter—is
hardly to begin to do justice to the topic. The times were chaotic; political strategies were in constant flux. Politics outside the halls of
Congress was keeping a watchful eye, but often distorting what hap38
39

40

Id.
JAMES E. BOND, NO EASY WALK TO FREEDOM: RECONSTRUCTION AND THE RATIFICATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 12 n.23 (1997); see also CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE
INTENDED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT vii (1997) (providing an analysis of the ratification debates in Pennsylvania, while noting that Pennsylvania was the only
State which preserved a complete record of the debates).
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 145 (1986).
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pened inside. Expecting coherence may be asking far too much. Recall again the examples from the previous Part. Unequivocally one of
the most important questions regarding Reconstruction is that of incorporation. Were the Reconstruction Amendments intended to apply the provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states? Portions of
them? To what extent? Debate over the intentions of those who
adopted the Fourteenth Amendment on this question still is ongoing.
There are voluminous studies, two of the most notable by Charles
41
Fairman and Akhil Amar. The two disagree vehemently. Though I
have my own view of who gets the better of that debate, the end of
controversy on this central question is hardly near.
Fourth, even if we knew the answers, we might be loath to accept
them. Two examples come immediately to mind here: the question
of segregated public schools and the application of the equality guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment along lines other than race.
Suffice to say that no theory of constitutional interpretation that sanctions school segregation or denies equality to women can be consid42
ered remotely viable today. There have been originalist arguments
consistent with this realpolitik, interesting and valiant ones, but the
consensus remains that originalists who seek to make the case for
gender equality and school desegregation consistent with the original
43
understanding are swimming upstream.
The difficulty in getting the Fourteenth Amendment to mean
what is politically palatable today is apparent in one notable attempt
at defending school desegregation that—to the extent it succeeds—

41

42

43

AMAR, supra note 24, at 215–30 (advocating a theory of “refined incorporation”); Charles
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 138 (1949) (concluding that the historical records argue
against total incorporation).
See Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Living Constitution, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1752 (2007) (noting that Brown has been canonized to a greater extent than explicit constitutional guarantees, such as the republican Guarantee Clause:
“While no Supreme Court nominee could be confirmed if he refused to embrace Brown,
he could safely confess great puzzlement about the meaning of ‘republican’ government
and gain a seat on the bench”); see also Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323,
1410–11 (2006) (discussing how popular belief in constitutional protections against sex
discrimination contributed to the defeat of Professor Bork’s nomination to the Supreme
Court).
See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 21, at 559–60 (noting that most originalists do not publically challenge equal protection doctrine’s adoption of sex discrimination). The accepted wisdom has been that Brown cannot be reconciled with an originalist approach, although this has been challenged by Michael W. McConnell in Originalism and the
Desegregation Decisions, supra note 22; regarding McConnell’s success, see Klarman, Brown,
Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, supra note 22.
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undermines the argument for gender equality. Taking the position
that Brown v. Board of Education was decided correctly as an originalist
matter, Robert Bork explained that the case involved a collision between two of the framers’ conceptions: racial equality and school segregation. When, in our time, it became apparent the two could not
co-exist, one had to give way. The more general concept of “equality”
44
trumped the more specific interest in segregation, Bork explained.
Paul Brest offered the following riposte: if the general principle of
45
equality prevailed, why not equality for, say, gays? Bork’s comeback:
46
because it was race the framers cared about. Even assuming Bork
was right (and one hardly would score him the winner of their debate), where precisely does that leave women’s equality?
No theory of constitutional interpretation can reach results plainly
unacceptable to the polity and remain tenable. The late lay originalist Raoul Berger relied on an (often contested) originalist methodology to skewer popular understandings of the Fourteenth Amend47
ment. But unlike many of today’s originalists, Berger was not selling
his methodology for widespread adoption and did not have to win
48
adherents. He was free to let his inquiries take him where they led.
Yet, originalist interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment are
likely to yield troubling resolutions of some of the most trenchant social issues of our time, issues on which a consensus has been hardfought. As we will see, there are some possible answers to the dilemma posed by the disparity between original understandings and
modern interpretations, but they are unlikely to be acceptable to
originalists.
B. Integrating the Constitution
Like a contract, or a statute, the Constitution is a document that
can be added to over time in ways that change the original meaning

44
45
46

47

48

BORK, supra note 19, at 82.
Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1091 (1981).
Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
823, 828 (1986) (“The intentionalist may conclude that he must enforce black and racial
equality but that he has no guidance at all about any higher level of generality.”).
See BERGER, supra note 30, at 364 (noting the importance of “original intention” in constitutional interpretation); see also O’ NEILL, supra note 25, at 111–32 (discussing the influence of Berger’s originalist constitutional interpretation in changing the terms of the
constitutional debate).
For example, Berger concluded that historical records “all but incontrovertibly establish
that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment excluded both suffrage and segregation
from its reach.” BERGER, supra note 30, at 407.
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49

of the text. The text of our Constitution has twenty-seven amendments adopted since the Founding. Although several of those were
technical amendments—for example to fix things plainly wrong with
the presidential selection process—others were of far broader import.
Interpreting the Constitution requires developing an understanding
not only of the original meanings, but how those meanings are
pieced together into one coherent whole, what Reva Siegel has called
50
“synthetic interpretation.” Yet, interpretive theory—including originalism—largely is lacking in an approach to the problem of constitutional integration.
Sometimes integrating text can be a simple matter. For example,
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly overrides the “three
fifths” clause of Article I, Section 2. Before adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, those in slavery counted for three-fifths of other
persons for purposes of congressional apportionment; after ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment there was no more chattel slavery,
and those formerly in slavery counted as whole persons. (Section 2
goes on to say, however, that if the vote was denied under certain
conditions to adult males in the state, then the apportionment was
reduced accordingly.)
But piecing together amendments with prior aspects of the Constitution’s text is not always such a mechanical endeavor. Consider,
for example, the relationship of the Eleventh Amendment to the
Fourteenth. Adopted in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in
51
Chisholm v. Georgia, the Eleventh Amendment essentially says States
52
cannot be sued in federal courts for money damages. Although this

49

50

51
52

See Balkin, supra note 27, at 490 (arguing that constitutional interpretation must take into
account how the Constitution’s structural principles changed as it was amended over
time).
See Siegel, supra note 17, at 966–68 (2002) (applying the idea of synthetic interpretation
to the Court’s decision in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), in which Fourteenth
Amendment principles were infused into the Fifth Amendment, and arguing that the Nineteenth Amendment should similarly inform modern interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause).
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (holding that federal courts had the authority to hear cases
against States by private citizens).
Chisholm was met with considerable surprise, and a constitutional amendment to overrule
Chisholm was introduced in Congress only two days after the Court issued its decision.
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 978–79 (5th ed. 2003). Or at least this is the common story. But see id. at
979 n.2 (summarizing diverse interpretations of the public reaction to Chisholm, including
scholarship which suggests that the reaction was fairly muted). In its final form, the Eleventh Amendment states: “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
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statement does not begin to capture the nuance of the Court’s Eleventh Amendment doctrine, it is a fair enough summary of how the
53
Court came to interpret the Amendment over time. The problem is
that the Fourteenth Amendment by its terms is a direct command to
the States, and Section 5 of that Amendment allows for congressional
enforcement. What then to do if Congress, pursuant to its Section 5
power, opens States up to claims for money damages in the federal
courts? Is such legislation valid under the Fourteenth Amendment,
or invalid under the Eleventh Amendment?
When confronted with the question in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, the
Court adopted a sort of last-in-time rule for constitutional interpretation, at least as it applied to this particular issue. As the Court explained:
But we think that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state
sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In that section
Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce “by appropriate legislation” the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
themselves embody significant limitations on state authority. When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority
that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising
that authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose
other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state authority.
We think that Congress may, in determining what is “appropriate legislation” for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials
54
which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.

This interpretation might seem entirely sensible. Not only did the
Fourteenth Amendment follow the Eleventh, but—as the Court indicates—the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in a nationalistic environment quite different from the states’ rights feelings that moti55
vated the Eleventh Amendment.
Radical Republicans frequently
pointed to the war as changing the basic assumptions underlying the
federal system. “I had in the simplicity of my heart, supposed that
‘State rights’ being the issue of the war, had been decided,” declared

53

54
55

United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 205–06 (3d ed.
2006) (discussing how Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence has been guided, in part, by
the Supreme Court’s concern about federal courts forcing state governments to pay
money damages).
427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (citation omitted).
Id. at 454–56 (drawing on a line of cases in which the Court viewed the Civil War
Amendments as intended to limit the power of the States and enlarge the power of Congress).
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the Radical Republican Richard Yates of Illinois in Congress in 1866.
Another Radical colleague agreed: “[h]itherto we have taken the
Constitution in a solution of the spirit of State rights. Let us now take
it as it is sublimed and crystallized in the flames of the most gigantic
57
war in history.”
And, indeed, this notion that national rights trumped state powers
played a powerful role in resolving interpretive tensions between the
Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments that were regularly presenting
themselves during the Gilded Age and the Lochner era that followed.
For example, at the turn of the nineteenth century States adopted
regulatory measures—such as ceilings on railroad rates—that many
private interests believed contravened Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. Those interested sued in federal court to restrain state legis58
lation, naming state officials as defendants. Once again, these state
officials demurred, arguing they were immune from suit under the
Eleventh. Ex parte Young, for example, involved a titan clash between
railroad interests that sought access to the federal courts to challenge
rate regulation, and the State of Minnesota, which preferred to liti59
gate in its own courts. Young, the Attorney General of the state, said
he could not be sued as a proxy for the state, offering up the text of
the Eleventh Amendment, prior precedents, and the general logic of
60
federalism. But the district judge in the case, ruling Young indeed
could be sued, said that logic compelled understanding the Fourteenth Amendment as trumping the Eleventh in this situation.
“There must be some way to enforce that provision of the Constitu61
tion,” he said, referring of course to the Fourteenth Amendment.
The decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court, in an opinion that
simply rested on the now-famous fiction that “the sovereignty of the
State” was not really involved “where the state official . . . is about to

56
57
58

59

60
61

CURTIS, supra note 40, at 55 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 99
(1866)).
CURTIS, supra note 40, at 48 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 163 (1866)).
See, e.g., Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894) (upholding an injunctive suit against the state attorney general and the railroad commission regarding rates);
Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1891) (allowing a suit against a state official regarding the constitutionality of a land use regulation).
209 U.S. 123 (1908). See generally, Barry Friedman, The Story of Ex parte Young, in
FEDERAL COURTS STORIES (Vicki Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., forthcoming 2009) (giving
a historical background to the case and noting that its “implicit message” is that “when a
state law is challenged as unconstitutional, adjudication of the constitutionality of that law
ought not to be left to the state courts”).
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 132.
Perkins v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 155 F. 445, 447 (C.C.D. Minn. 1907).
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commence suits, which have for their object the enforcement of an
62
act which violates the Federal Constitution.”
In truth, though, the Court hardly hewed closely to its last-in-time
view of constitutional interpretation, even with regard to the Eleventh
and Fourteenth Amendments. Rather, throughout the Gilded Age,
reconciling the two provisions gave the Court fits in ways that still
make coherent interpretation of the case law difficult today. In one
sense the problem the Court faced was posed by the Eleventh
Amendment’s relationship to the body of the Constitution that preceded it. Article I, Section 10 of the original Constitution contains
the Contracts Clause, which prohibits States from impairing the obligations of contracts. When, in the years after Reconstruction, many
states and municipalities were sued for refusing to pay their own
debts, they frequently raised Eleventh Amendment defenses to those
63
actions. But critics argued that that the Eleventh Amendment itself
was an invalid change to the Constitution precisely because it could
64
not be squared with the Contract Clause of Article I. How could
one enforce contracts, critics asked, if there was allowed no suit in
(federal) court to do so? The Eleventh Amendment, the editors of
the Nation suggested in 1879, “has been a standing reproach to the
nation ever since, inasmuch as it has been a continuous cover for fla65
grant injustice.” Although the Supreme Court never explicitly accepted the argument that the Eleventh Amendment altered the Con66
tracts Clause in some unacceptable way, anyone familiar with the
odd course of Eleventh Amendment jurisdiction knows well that implicitly the thrust of the argument proved somewhat persuasive. Accordingly, the Court rendered interpretations of the Eleventh
62
63

64

65

66

Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 167.
See JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 58 (1987) (noting that Louisiana and North Carolina
together repudiated debts of twenty-seven million dollars).
Id. at 66–67 (noting that maligned bondholders who brought suit under this theory were
unable to overcome the Eleventh Amendment bar); see Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 446 (1883); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1883).
The Federal Judiciary and the Repudiators, 705 NATION 5 (1879) (asserting that “[n]othing
could be more unfair in practice or reprehensible in principle. . . . [The Eleventh]
amendment impaired the symmetry of the Constitutional plan as first adopted. . . . At this
day, by reason of it, there are obligations of States, issued under their broad seals, outstanding to the amount of one hundred and eighty millions of dollars that are dishonored, and no legal remedy exists to their injured holders.”).
In fact, the idea that the Constitution simply cannot be amended in particular ways never
has gained as much attention in the United States as it has abroad. For example, the
German Constitution makes certain provisions unamendable. Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutions as “Living Trees”? Comparative Constitutional Law and Interpretive Metaphors, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 921, 933 n.47 (2006).
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Amendment that permitted suits in federal court over government
debts, for example by holding that the Amendment applied to States
but not state officials, or by concluding that States could not be sued,
67
but municipalities could. Thus, later-in-time amendments apparently can be ignored when inconvenient or difficult to reconcile with
pre-existing constitutional ideals.
Conversely, the Court has been willing to find the original text altered even when no later text clearly did so, an issue brought to the
fore by the Court’s gender equality decisions. As we have seen, women’s equality was hardly the goal of the framers of the Fourteenth
68
Amendment. Yet, the Court in United States v. Morrison relied on
cases like Reed v. Reed and Craig v. Boren for its now apparently unchallengeable position that the Fourteenth Amendment does cover dis69
crimination against women. However, just as the Court was rendering decisions like Reed v. Reed, Frontiero v. Richardson, and Craig v.
Boren, drawing women into the equal protection fold, the country was
outright rejecting the Equal Rights Amendment, which would have
done so explicitly. The Court’s decisions are remarkably silent as to
how this transformation in the constitutional meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment came to pass. Reed plausibly applies the general
mandate of equal protection to a case of gender discrimination, and
70
says little else. By Craig, though, the Court was plainly applying
heightened scrutiny to such claims of gender equality—a scrutiny
71
72
that after decisions like VMI and Mississippi School for Women may
indeed be strict—with no explanation of what changed the Constitu-

67

68
69

70

71
72

See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit a suit against a county); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 857–58 (1824) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar
suit against state officers).
See supra notes 13–16, 24 and accompanying text.
529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000) (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) [hereinafter VMI] and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198–99 (1976), as part of case law establishing that gender discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause unless it “serves ‘important governmental objectives and . . . the discriminatory means employed’ are
‘substantially related to the achievement of those objectives’”).
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (stating that “[t]o give a mandatory preference to
members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination
of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
518 U.S. 515 (holding that the Virginia Military Institute’s male-only admissions policy
violated the Equal Protection Clause).
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding that it was violative of the
Equal Protection Clause to deny men admission to an all-female nursing school).
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tion since the adoption of the Fourteenth and the failure of the
73
Equal Rights Amendment.
Reva Siegel has provided an explanation for the gender equality
74
decisions, which is rooted at least in part in clause integration. Siegel’s primary argument rests in the success of social movements’
claims for women’s equality, an interpretive technique with which I
have considerable sympathy. Still, she recognizes the benefits if not
the necessity of having an available constitutional text, and she has
one to which she can point: ratification of the Nineteenth Amend75
ment, extending the franchise to women.
Not everyone will buy the argument that the Nineteenth Amendment amended the Fourteenth, thereby expanding the mandate of
the latter into the area of women’s equality. But some explanation is
needed for the well-accepted conclusion of the Morrison Court. Originalists in particular need an argument on this point, but they are
76
largely at sea in explaining the equality decisions. Indeed, there is
not really an originalist theory of constitutional integration of any
sort.
C. Rejecting Constitutional Amendments
For the most part, constitutional interpreters seem to favor a methodology that constructs a straight story from the adoption of constitutional text to the present, with few deviations in meaning. All recognize, of course, that there have been detours from the one true
path—no matter how that path is defined. Liberals tend to believe
the Lochner era was one such, with the correct course re-established

73

74

75
76

In Craig, the Court relied primarily on Reed v. Reed and subsequent cases to justify heightened scrutiny; although the Court condemned “‘archaic and overbroad’ generalizations”
about the sexes, it did not root this objection in either constitutional text or original understanding. 429 U.S. at 198.
Siegel, supra note 17, at 966 (defining the method of synthetic interpretation as “interpret[ing] one clause or provision in light of another—attending especially to relations
among different parts of the Constitution as they are interpreted or amended over
time”).
Id. at 949–51.
Originalist scholars often fall back on the argument that sex discrimination is similar to
race discrimination. For example, Steven Calabresi argues that sex can viewed as a
“caste” for discrimination purposes in his article The Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme
Court’s Reliance on Foreign Constitutional Law: An Originalist Reappraisal, 65 OHIO ST. L.J.
1097, 1120–21 (2004). Taking a different approach, John Harrison hints that the Privileges and Immunities Clause could be used to protect against sex discrimination in Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, supra note 26, at 1460–61.
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77

after the New Deal fight. Some conservatives, on the other hand,
see the New Deal settlement itself as a departure from the original
78
constitutional meaning. The general point, though, is that in interpreting the Constitution, deviation is to be minimized; a coherent
story should be told from start to finish, and over-rulings of Supreme
Court decisions should be relatively few.
Unfortunately, that’s not how it is with actual American constitutional history, which often has charted a more winding course in
which even foundational moments can be rejected at a later time.
Reconstruction stands as paradigmatic here. Not long after the adoption of the Civil War Amendments, and much embellishment of them
in statutory text, the country lost its patience with the entire endeavor. It turned its back on the freedmen, and on most of the commitments to them that had been extended during the tumultuous
79
years following the Civil War.
Commonly employed interpretive methodologies find it difficult
to grapple with such sharp turns in the constitutional path. There is
one sentence in United States v. Morrison that is remarkable in this regard. Justifying the state action requirement that spells the death to
the private right of action under the Violence Against Women Act,
the Court states that “[s]hortly after the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted, we decided two cases interpreting the Amendment’s provi80
sions,” one of which was The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
And that case, explained the Court, barred legislation under the
81
Fourteenth Amendment aimed at private conduct.
The Court’s “shortly after” claim is breathtaking in its disregard of
actual historical events. The Civil Rights Cases came the better part of
82
a generation after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. During that fifteen-year period, it is fair to say that political ideals in the
United States were turned on their head as much as virtually any other period in history.
77

78
79

80
81
82

See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 259 (1998) (exploring the
idea that “the New Deal Court was simply reestablishing itself in the main stream of
American constitutional law”).
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Mistakes of 1937, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 5, 7–12
(1988) (critiquing post-1937 Commerce Clause jurisprudence as “tragic”).
For an account of this, claiming that the rejection of Reconstruction could be considered
its own constitutional “moment,” see Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional
Moment, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 115 (1994). For Bruce Ackerman’s response, see
ACKERMAN, supra note 77, at 471 n.126.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000).
Id.
The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, while the Civil Rights Cases were decided in 1883. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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Between the onset of Reconstruction and the Gilded Age that followed, rapid social change caused the country to turn its back on the
original commitments of the Civil War Amendments with startling
speed. The Civil War jump-started America’s industrial revolution,
altering forever the nature of economic life in the United States. In
the middle of all this economic transition, the Crash of 1873—
occasioned by a severe tightening of credit when the banking house
83
of Jay Cooke failed—left the country in dire economic straits. By
the time of the disputed Hayes-Tilden election of 1876, the country
had altogether tired of the expense and effort required to protect the
freedman, and was ready for an entirely new course. “We have
tried . . . constant partisan intermeddling from Washington and
bayonets ad lib. The malady,” explained the Springfield Republican,
“does not yield to the treatment. Let us now try . . . a little vigorous
84
letting alone.” Hayes’s victory was a negotiated deal that allowed the
Republicans to hold the White House so long as military control of
the South came to an end. Reconstruction was not only over by 1877,
but the state of affairs on the ground was moving quickly to reverse its
course. Redeemer governments in the South harshly oppressed
blacks, driving them from office, depriving them of the franchise,
85
and snuffing out the promise of Reconstruction. By the 1890s the
86
job was done. The 1896 decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, in which the
Supreme Court gave its imprimatur to State-enforced racial apartheid, ran comfortably in the current of a sharply-altered understanding of what Reconstruction was supposed to accomplish.
This sharp change of sentiments was echoed time and again in
popular “huzzahs” as the Court dismantled Reconstruction. Even as
the Congress was debating the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the Chicago
Tribune, which had supported abolition during the war, was asking “Is
87
it not time for the colored race to stop playing baby?” In 1875, the
Court decided United States v. Cruikshank, involving criminal prosecutions by the federal government of those responsible for the slaughter of several hundred blacks in the fight for political control of Lou88
isiana.
The Court overturned the convictions, adopting a very
83
84
85
86
87
88

See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–
1877, at 512–63 (1988) (describing the economic depression that began in 1873).
REPUBLICAN, Jan. 11, 1875, quoted in WILLIAM GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM
RECONSTRUCTION, 1869–1879, at 280 (1979).
See FONER, supra note 83, at 588–98 (detailing the various methods used to dismantle the
Reconstruction state and subordinate blacks).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
The Nigger School, CHI. TRIB., June 8, 1874, at 4.
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
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limited view of Congress’s powers under the Fourteenth and Fif89
teenth Amendments. Another journal with abolitionist roots, New
York’s Independent, responded to the Court’s decision in Cruikshank
saying “[t]o assume State powers as the method of punishing and
preventing wrong in the States would be an experiment with our political system that had better be omitted. . . . Southern ques90
tions . . . must be left to the States themselves . . . .” When, in the
1883 Civil Rights Cases, the Court invalidated the Civil Rights Act of
1875, the New York Times joined most of the popular press in commending the Justices: “The judgment of the court is but a final chapter in a history full of wretched blunders, made possible by the sin91
cerest and noblest sentiment of humanity . . . .”
The practical undoing of Reconstruction poses a further challenge today because with it came a swift return to antebellum federalist principles. Decisions limiting the impact of the Civil War
Amendments and accompanying legislation were necessary, the
Court explained, because the framers of the Reconstruction
Amendments simply had not intended to alter the settled understandings of national-state relations. The Slaughterhouse Court rejected the butcher’s claims, saying to do otherwise “radically changes
the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal govern92
ments to each other and of both those governments to the people.”
In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court announced that the Fourteenth
Amendment did “not invest Congress with power to legislate upon
93
subjects which are within the domain of State legislation.”
To present the Civil Rights Cases as a contemporary interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, therefore, as the Court did in Morrison, is simply little disingenuous. It is difficult to understand it as anything other than a reflection of the impulse to tell constitutional history in a straight path. Rather than persuading knowing readers on
this count, however, the decision in Morrison starkly demonstrates the
difficulty posed in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment today.
The question is what one does with constitutional principles—let
alone constitutional text—that the country subsequently rejects. Re89

90
91
92
93

Id. at 555–56 (stating that the Fifteenth Amendment was not implicated and declaring
that the Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect equal rights “was originally assumed by
the States; and it still remains there. The only obligation resting upon the United States
is to see that the States do not deny the right”).
INDEPENDENT, Apr. 6, 1876, quoted in 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY 1836–1918, at 605 (rev. ed. 1926).
The Rights of Negroes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1883, at 4.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1872).
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
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construction is hardly the only example of the phenomenon, but it is
94
a telling one. Originalists might argue, consistently with their general methodology, that undoing constitutional text requires more
95
constitutional text. Thus, the era of Prohibition ushered in with the
Eighteenth Amendment properly was toppled by the Twenty-first.
But Reconstruction, having not ever been formally undone, remains
as it was.
D. Constitutional Revisionism
It is not quite that simple, though. Originalists no doubt would
deny that their methodology was intended to lead to any specific outcomes, and would insist that they interpret according to their canons
and the chips fall where they may. Underscoring the point, there
certainly are originalists—Randy Barnett comes to mind—who have
read original moments in ways that are not entirely congruent with
96
the generally conservative philosophy of originalism. Nonetheless, it
is a fact that originalism and conservativism often are fellow travelers,
and no doubt originalism is attractive to many conservatives precisely
because it seems to render results consistent with ideological commitments. There is nothing illegitimate about this; cognitive coherence typically implies adopting theoretical understandings that comport with one’s priors as to appropriate results. As will be apparent,
however, if the historical aftermath of Reconstruction is taken seriously, originalist interpretations are likely to diverge from certain
conservative ideological commitments. In short, one cannot necessarily have one’s methodological cake and eat it too.
For many originalists, the “switch in time” that followed Roosevelt’s threat to pack the Supreme Court in 1937, and much of what
happened thereafter to grant Congress virtually unlimited control
over the economy, was a betrayal of originalist constitutional under-

94

95

96

Another significant example occurred in the years leading up to 1937, when the country
forced the Supreme Court to abandon long-standing notions of limited congressional
powers in the economic realm, yet another signal that prevalent understandings of American federalism had undergone a sea change. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at ch.7.
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent, and
Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 686–87 (2006) (arguing that the text is far more relevant than
precedent); McConnell, supra note 79, at 143 (arguing that without a textual amendment, “the courts cannot know whether a constitutional moment has taken place until after they have acquiesced in it”).
For example, Barnett’s understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment as providing
stronger and more expansive liberty protections has been dismissed by another originalist
as “faulty.” Calabresi, supra note 19, at 3.
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standings about congressional power and federalism. To be sure,
most originalists are not kamikazes. Robert Bork, for example, has
conceded that as much as he may disapprove of the post New Deal
expansion of regulatory authority, we just are not going to turn the
98
clock all the way back. But not all originalists are so sanguine. The
Constitution in Exile movement in fact seeks a return to much of the
99
New Deal doctrine. And those originalists who are willing to concede some expansion in federal authority nonetheless disagree with
100
In
the Court’s abandonment of property rights at the same time.
short, most originalists are fans of federalist principles that would limit national authority and empower the States. And they believe in the
protection of property rights.
The difficulty is that the “original understanding” to which these
originalists would return is itself highly dubious at best if not wholly
fictive. It is far more a product of post-Reconstruction revisionism
than of any original Founding moment. And that revisionism is Janus-faced: while it might support certain property-rights claims of
conservatives, it does so at the expense of their more general reliance
on principles of federalism in limiting national power.
The cases decided by the Supreme Court in the immediate aftermath of the adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments granted little protection for property rights. In 1873, in the Slaughterhouse Cases,
the Court made a point of saying the Fourteenth Amendment was
about protecting the rights of the freedmen, and it strongly rejected a
claim by New Orleans butchers that a Louisiana law creating a butch101
ering monopoly violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Evoking the words of Justice White in Bowers v. Hardwick, one might
say that the Slaughterhouse Court found claims of this sort of protection of property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment altogether

97

98

99

100
101

See e.g., Epstein, supra note 78 (criticizing the change in constitutional interpretation that
began in 1937); Bernard H. Siegan, Rehabilitating Lochner, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 453
(1985) (examining the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment and concluding
that Lochner was consistent with the framers’ intent).
See BORK, supra note 19, at 216 (“[T]he consolidation of all power at the federal level is
too firmly entrenched and woven into our governmental practices and private lives to be
undone.”).
See Douglas H. Ginsburg, On Constitutionalism, 2002–2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 7 (criticizing the Court’s expansive reading of the Commerce Clause and urging the revival of the
nondelegation doctrine); Jeffrey Rosen, Justice Thomas’s Other Controversy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
17, 2005, at E44 (quoting Constitution in Exile defender Michael Greve: “I think what is
really needed here is a fundamental intellectual assault on the entire New Deal edifice.”)
BARNETT, supra note 26, at 222–23.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72–73 (1872) (stating that the main purpose of the Reconstruction
Amendments was to protect people of African descent).
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102

“facetious.” In Munn v. Illinois, in 1877, the Court gave way a little
bit: it suggested that state regulation of property might be subject to
some challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment, but not so if the
103
property was devoted to the “public interest.” The Court endowed
the term “public interest” with such a capacious meaning, however,
including within it railroads and grain elevators, that the majority
opinion elicited a strong dissent from that longtime advocate for
104
property rights Stephen Field.
But the Munn majority was nonplussed: “For protection against abuses by legislatures the people
105
must resort to the polls, not to the courts.”
Over the next fifty years or so, though, the Fourteenth Amendment experienced a remarkable revival, not to help the freedmen,
but as a vehicle for the protection of property interests. One can explore this expansion of the Fourteenth Amendment’s jurisdiction
with an internal (doctrinal) story or an external (political) one, but
106
the upshot was the same either way.
By the turn of the twentieth
century the clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment that initially had
been closed off to property rights and corporate interests by the
Slaughterhouse and Munn Courts were wide open for business, which
was bustling. During the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, the Supreme Court went on a binge of striking down state laws to further
107
the interests of property and capital.
Their weapons were varied,
among them the Dormant Commerce Clause, substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and a sort of common law
constitutionalism that was applied in diversity cases and cases on direct review. The lower federal courts became a congenial home for

102
103
104
105
106

107

See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986).
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125–26 (1877).
Id. at 140 (Field, J., dissenting) (“If this be sound law . . . all property and all business in
the State are held at the mercy of a majority of its legislature.”)
Id. at 134 (majority opinion).
For an exploration of both types of stories, see generally SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman,
eds., 1999).
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at chs. 5–6 (describing how the Court struck down many
state laws during this period); Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner—Diversity Jurisdiction and
the Development of General Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1272–79 (2000) (discussing how the Court’s invalidation of state business regulations through general constitutional law in diversity suits, see, e.g., Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. 175 (1863),
paved the way for Lochner-era invalidation of economic regulations on Fourteenth
Amendment grounds, see, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897)).
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corporations seeking protection from state regulation and private sui108
tors.
The difficulty, of course, lies in justifying this activism by the federal courts in the name of property rights. There is a body of historical scholarship that ties these decisions—at least the substantive due
process ones—to the Constitution, largely by arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment itself incorporated the “free labor” ideology of
109
the antebellum era.
These “Lochner revisionists” thus seek to explain how the now-reviled decisions of the Lochner era actually had a
firm basis in pre-existing jurisprudence. Although the Lochner revisionists are surely correct that the Lochner era decisions had jurisprudential roots in the Gilded Age, there still is room to question whether they necessarily can be tied to the original understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
For present purposes, though, the important point is that no matter where one comes down on the question of the legitimacy of substantive due process in service of property rights, it is extremely difficult to bless the property rights doctrine as an originalist matter and
still hold firm to antebellum understandings of federalism. The
Gilded Age Court was wildly admired by business and property interests for what it was doing to preserve the sanctity of property under
the Constitution. The Court plainly did so, however, at the expense
of state autonomy and constitutional federalism. The opponents of
the Gilded Age Court were themselves the ones interested in protecting states’ rights. They frequently denounced the Court for tram110
pling on state sovereignty.
By the time of the Supreme Court’s fight against the New Deal,
though, the Supreme Court was adopting both a pro-property rights
108

109

110

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at ch.5 (discussing the federal judiciary’s relative friendliness
to corporations, as compared to state judiciaries); Howard Gillman, How Political Parties
Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 519 (2002) (describing how business interests flocked to the federal courts).
For an overview of Lochner revisionism, see Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1397–1402
(2001); see also William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the
Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 783 (“[T]he abolitionist talked about the freedom of the
Northern worker in terms of self-ownership, that is, simply not being a slave, being free to
sell his own labor.”).
See Current Topics, 18 CENT. L.J. 281, 282 (1884) (declaring that no one but those representing corporate interests “can look upon this invasion of the domain of the State judiciary with any thing but regret”); Notes, 27 AM. L. REV. 382, 396 (1893) (charging the judges
who decided Gelpcke with “plain usurpation”); William M. Meigs, Decisions of the Federal
Courts on Questions of State Law, 8 S. L. REV. 452, 478 (1882) (calling Gelpcke “a most radical
departure from precedent and principle”).
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interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and a vision of federalism as a limit on congressional power. As my colleague William Nelson once put it to me, the New Deal was the first time in history that
the Court was forced to choose between business and the federal
government. It chose the former and the rest is history. (As the
Court ultimately learned, it is not wise to bite the hand that sustains
you.) This period, prior to the Court’s “switch” in 1937 and thereafter, is precisely the time to which originalists would like to return.
Bruce Ackerman provides an argument that grounds both property rights and limited state power decisions in the Constitution. He
synthesizes the original Founding and Reconstruction to arrive at the
conclusion that Lochner era protection of property rights was appropriate, because those rights are found in the original Constitution
and Reconstruction properly is interpreted to require a nationalist
111
protection for all such rights. On the other hand, he says, Reconstruction did not alter the scope of national power generally when
constitutionally-protected rights were not at issue, so that next shift
112
had to wait until the New Deal.
Originalists undoubtedly will cotton to Ackerman’s thesis—but
only the first two-thirds of it! Ackerman famously goes on to argue
that when it comes to the question of national power, the New Deal—
and particularly the Court fight—signaled a national referendum in
favor of what was effectively an amendment to the Constitution to
113
give Congress much broader sway in the economic realm. Originalists are hardly excited to sign on to this aspect of Ackerman’s theory,
which recognizes a momentous constitutional change occurring
without textual amendment. As noted above, most originalists seem
willing to concede the impossibility of returning to a pre-New Deal
understanding of national power, even though on methodological
grounds they cannot agree that a non-textual amendment actually altered the Constitution.
Ackerman’s “one-two synthesis” is provocative and has a lot to it,
but it is a little bit too tidy to really unite originalist methodology and
conservative views of constitutional meaning. Even if one acknowledges that the Constitution was changed during Reconstruction in
just the way he says, i.e., to nationalize certain rights, Ackerman also
recognizes that the country turned its back on those commitments

111
112
113

1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 100–01 (1991).
Id. at 102–03.
ACKERMAN, supra note 77, at 279–311.
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114

shortly thereafter.
How can we be so certain that the country rejected only part of the original meaning of the Reconstruction
Amendments and not all of it? As we already have seen, in 1873 the
Slaughterhouse Court narrowly interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to exclude from its ambit precisely those sorts of property
115
claims that would become dominant in the later years. Yet, Slaugh116
terhouse was met with plaudits from the country at large. So why did
the entire notion of nationalized rights not crumble as Reconstruction did? Further, when the Court did begin to recognize Fourteenth
Amendment property rights claims in the coming decades, there was
a hue and cry about it precisely because those decisions held insuffi117
cient regard for state autonomy.
As a matter of fact, originalists seem split on whether Ackerman’s
account of the Gilded Age even is correct. Some, those who put large
118
stock in property rights, appear to agree.
But many others, perfectly cognizant of the fact that those decisions were grounded in substantive due process—the same vehicle that protects abortion rights
and the rights of homosexuals—demur. Robert Bork, for example,
attacks Lochnerizing relentlessly, though Ackerman would defend it
119
on originalist grounds.
My own view is that the story is more textured, and—
accordingly—difficult to interpret as justifying either Ackerman’s or
the originalists’ “one-two” synthesis. Following the collapse of Recon-

114
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Id. at 471–74 n.126 (recognizing that American institutions increasingly failed to protect
black Americans after Reconstruction but rejecting McConnell’s claim that this backturning constituted a constitutional moment of its own).
See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
See WARREN, supra note 90, at 543–46 (documenting broad support among the major
newspapers for the Court’s decision).
See Ray A. Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court, 40 HARV. L. REV.
943, 966 (1927) (“The Court has acknowledged great regard for the legislatures’ conclusions of fact and opinion, but its action often belies its words, and even its own members
accuse it of abuse of authority.”); The New York Labour Law and the Fourteenth Amendment,
21 L.Q. REV. 211, 212 (1905) (criticizing the Court for treating the state legislature as if it
were “an inferior court which has to give affirmative proof of its competence”).
See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 26, at 253–54 (advocating equal protection of enumerated
and unenumerated rights); David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469 (2005) (placing Lochner in historical context); Epstein, supra note 78, at 13–18 (pointing out the significance that Lochner concerned freedom of
contract); Siegan, supra note 97 (explaining the historical background to Lochner and
stating that the case was consistent with an original interpretation of the Constitution).
BORK, supra note 19, at 46–49 (1990) (describing Allgeyer and Lochner as “unjustifiable assumptions of power”); see also Calabresi, supra note 19, at 13 (“We must never forget that
Dred Scott v. Sandford, Lochner v. New York, and Korematsu v. United States were all substantive
due process decisions where the Court was guided by its own twisted ideas about what
‘human dignity’ required.”).
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struction, the country’s commitment to nationalized rights was not
strongly apparent again until the defeat of FDR’s Court-packing plan
in 1937. One of the chief arguments against Roosevelt’s plan was that
there were constitutional rights that would be in jeopardy but for the
existence of a Supreme Court independent enough to protect
120
them. By then, however, people were thinking primarily of what we
121
today call “civil rights,” not property rights. Even that commitment
did not really flower until the 1960s. (By the same token, property
rights died a sharp death after the New Deal, something Ackerman
122
explains as part of the New Deal non-textual amendment).
The picture is just as confused (or nuanced, depending on how
you want to see it) on the federalism side of the equation. The same
Gilded Age Court that protected property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment also based many of its pro-business decisions on
the Dormant Commerce Clause. This surely was a question of national powers, not rights, of the sort that Ackerman generally would
bracket, leaving for resolution in the New Deal years. To be sure,
there is a story one can tell of the Gilded Age Justices struggling to
find the right balance between state and national authority in a rapidly changing economy. The Court’s “original package” cases regarding state authority to limit the importation of alcohol is a good ex123
ample of this. It also shows the Court trying to navigate its way on a
difficult issue of heightened public attention.
The problem for originalists is that these sorts of nuanced stories
are grounded as much in doctrinal development—what David Strauss
calls common law constitutionalism—and subsequent history as they
124
are in foundational moments. The winding case law departs quite a
120
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See Editorial, Not Safe for Democracy, DES MOINES REG., in Opinions of the Nation’s Press on
Court Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1937, at 10 (declaring that “executive aggrandizement is
not safe for democracy”). See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at ch.7 (describing public
concerns about civil liberties in the face of the court packing plan).
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at ch.7 (discussing popular concern over civil liberties during the New Deal court fight).
ACKERMAN, supra note 77, at 280 (arguing that “Lochner is no longer good law because the
American people repudiated Republican constitutional values in the 1930’s, not because
the Republican Court was wildly out of line”).
See Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 124–25 (1890) (holding that the Commerce Clause bars
Iowa from restricting the sale of imported alcohol that remains in its original package
without Congressional authorization). Shortly thereafter, the Court upheld the Wilson
Act of 1890, which authorized states to regulate the import of liquor across their borders,
In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 562 (1891); the Court later carved out an exception for out-ofstate mail-order liquor sales. Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co., 170 U.S. 438, 452–53 (1898).
See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877 (1996) (describing the “common law approach to constitutional interpretation”);
David Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001)
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bit from the original meaning. (Alternatively, sometimes the original
meaning is initially obscure, and gets worked out in the intervening
years.) The reality is that history does not move in the comfortable
forward path that most constitutional interpretation asks of it. There
are fits and starts, wrong moves, sharp turns, and serious departures.
Legal doctrines and philosophical commitments deemed to go handin-hand at the present did not in the past. And still, some sense must
be made of it all. The strategy adopted most frequently by constitutional interpreters of all methodological stripes and ideological
commitments—including originalism—is of ignoring inconvenient
portions of the story, of telling a tale that follows a straight line from
what one imagined happened to how one wants things to be. This
sort of approach is difficult to square with the messy facts on the
ground.
E. The Question of Rebirth
In 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court held
that segregated public schools violated the Constitution. In resolving
the question of segregated schools, the Court said “we cannot turn
125
the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted.” Yet, in
a sense it did. The long chill begun in 1873 with Slaughterhouse, confirmed in 1883 with the Civil Rights Cases, and ratified in Plessy in
1896, had ended. The thaw had been gradual, perhaps, but by the
end of the 1950s, and certainly by the 1960s, the “original” Reconstruction commitment to racial equality had experienced a new birth.
In witnessing this rebirth of the country’s commitment to racial
equality, one can once again see the apparent impetus of constitutional interpreters to tell a progressive story of constitutional fidelity.
As the plurality in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
126
Casey explained, “Plessy was wrong the day it was decided.” For what
it is worth, this seems to be an impulse shared by the left and right
alike. In part because any theory of constitutional interpretation that
denies basic equality on the basis of race or gender is untenable, virtually all constitutional interpreters today sanctify the Court’s seminal
race and gender decisions, which obviously find some textual support
in the Reconstruction Amendments. But though this impetus is understandable, it is not accurate to history to claim any clear continuity

125
126

(arguing that amendments to the Constitution do not largely alter the meaning of the
Constitution).
347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).
505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992).
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from Reconstruction to the present structure of constitutional equality.
The difficulty is that nothing ever is reborn just as it was. It is possible, and at times admirable, to seek a grounding for the present in
the past. But to pretend that we simply can return or are returning
there is to engage in the most blatant of fictions, one that does a real
disservice to who we are as a constitutional polity.
On the one hand, candor requires acknowledging that the country’s long deviation from the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment imposed enormous disabilities on AfricanAmericans, burdens that themselves influenced the very direction of
subsequent American history—political and constitutional. The
freedmen were disenfranchised and disempowered through blatant
127
chicanery and bouts of nauseating violence. The Republican Party
retained its political hegemony in the aftermath of Reconstruction
only at the expense of its breach of faith to the freedmen. To say that
the Constitution simply “returned” to its original rails is to deny the
path dependence of these intervening events, to say that somehow
the constitutional history of the nation runs entirely independently of
128
its political and social history.
By the same token, it would be gross oversimplification to claim
that the Court and country are now acting true to the original Fourteenth Amendment. For the very reasons discussed above, at present
we are lacking of a clear understanding of what that original understanding even was. We cannot know if such foundational cases such
as the Civil Rights Cases would have been decided the way they were
had not the country turned its back on Reconstruction. All we can do
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See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 61–93 (2007) (describing racial discrimination and violence in the South at the
end of the nineteenth century and the Supreme Court decisions that followed).
Who can say with any certainty what would have been the impact on the country or the
Constitution if such disenfranchisement had not occurred? To pick but one example,
there is at least some tentative evidence that states that adopted more of the progressives’
agenda during the Lochner era were those states in a greater portion of the population was
enfranchised: not just African Americans, but the poor, and women as well. In turn, in
some of the states in which judges struck down these laws on the basis of the Constitution,
retribution was taken against the judges. States adopted recalls of judges, of decisions,
and supermajority voting requirements. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at ch. 6. Conservatives and liberals tell contending stories about what judges were doing during the Lochner
era, but all agree it was an important time in political and constitutional history alike,
with the two interlocking. Yet, had the path of Reconstruction operated uninterrupted,
this period may have looked very different.
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is make our best effort to reconstruct the original understanding and
129
transpose it to fit an entirely different world.
IV. CONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION
Where does this leave us? In closing I’d like to make three points.
First, that Reconstruction and its aftermath highlight the difficulty
with originalism as an interpretive methodology. Second, that rather
than originalism, some synthetic understanding of constitutional history is both necessary and inevitable. Third, that although synthesis is
required, the nature of constitutional law, as opposed to constitutional history, requires a backward-looking synthesis, one that accommodates as many of the relevant events and precedents as possible, but nonetheless discards those that simply do not fit. This third
point is an ironic one, in that it presents some justification for approaches to constitutional interpretation that insist on seeing constitutional history in a linear way. Yet, as I explain, there is a better way
to do this “backward” fitting to a constitutional line.
The first point, regarding the difficulties of originalism, ought to
be well-established by this point. Originalism, at least as commonly
practiced, tends to be atomistic: what is the original meaning of the
Constitution that answers X or Y question we grapple with today?
Originalist methodology tends to be bounded in time, as though
there was one understanding at time T1, that answers X or Y. But our
Constitution has inescapably changed over time. Even if one looks
only to alterations in the Constitution’s actual text, and seeks the
original understanding of those, still there must be a way of integrating those understandings, something originalists have by-and-large
failed to do. The real problem is that, even if it could be and were
done properly, originalism is unlikely to yield a set of results that is
tenable politically and palatable to the conservative impulses of originalists. Generalizing, one ought properly to be skeptical of any interpretive methodology that so consistently seems to yield results favored by any particular political ideology.
The failings of originalism are so vast that it is the staying power of
the methodology that begs explanation. But the reasons for this are
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And of course changes in constitutional interpretation over time need not reflect infidelity to the Constitution’s original meaning. See generally Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith,
The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1998) (arguing that the Constitution is
best understood as being layered with different interpretations over time); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993) (suggesting that interpretation of
constitutional text in different historical contexts is similar to an act of translation).
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not so very complicated. As Reva Siegel and Robert Post have made
clear, originalism is not an interpretive methodology so much as it is
130
So long as originalism proves useful to that ideology
an ideology.
its appeal will remain. For what it is worth, the movement for original understanding, while fervent, remains small. The American public has surely not bought into the doctrine, and on the Court it resolves few cases. Nonetheless, originalist language gnaws insidiously
131
around the edges, distorting doctrine in troubling ways. One of the
real values of focusing on Reconstruction is that given its largely progressive tendencies, the results compelled by an originalist perspective on the Civil War Amendments may serve to undermine the methodology itself. It might collapse under its own weight.
None of this is to say history is unimportant. To the contrary, it is
difficult to fathom how we could understand either ourselves or our
Constitution without recourse to history. And, assuredly, that history
essentially includes the foundational moments. But there is a lot of
ground between obsessive focus on the foundational moment to the
exclusion of all that follows, and an approach that takes all of history
into account.
As the history of the Reconstruction Amendments demonstrates,
the only real alternative is to adopt a synthetic understanding of the
Constitution. One must holistically take account of the entire Constitution. And one must labor to read that document as it has changed
over time. Reading in this way requires taking account of both those
principles adopted, and those rejected, in the words of Justice Harlan, “what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed
132
as well as the traditions from which it broke.” To take one vivid example, the present commitment to racial equality was not born out of
the events of Reconstruction. To the contrary, it had its roots in revulsion to what the rejection of Reconstruction meant, particularly in
the Jim Crow South. It is impossible, therefore, to interpret the
commitment to equality by looking primarily to 1868, when the rele-
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See generally Post & Siegel, supra note 21.
For example, the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test used to review whether police
conduct constitutes a search, articulated in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), has
been undercut by originalist decisions, with Justice Scalia leading the way. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299–300 (1999) (stating that courts should look first to
the common law at the time of the Founding to determine whether a certain type of police search is valid, and then examine modern societal norms only if the originalist inquiry leaves the question unresolved); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581–85 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing against the general warrant rule for searches and in favor
of a reasonableness inquiry based on “the protection that the common law afforded”).
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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vant events are far closer at hand. To take another example, the gradual incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the States was—
again—not really a response to the original understanding of the Reconstruction Amendments. Rather, it built upon them but responded to the felt necessities of the post-World War II era, the time
in which incorporation primarily occurred.
This sort of synthetic interpretation assuredly presents a wide variety of difficulties. It is not easy to piece together all of American history, which hardly has followed one straightforward path. It is often
difficult to distinguish those aspects of history that represent the
American people speaking to constitutional norms. Bruce Ackerman
addresses this problem with a schematized structure for identifying
constitutional moments. The impulse is correct, but constitutional
change occurs upon a number of paths, not all of them as dramatic as
those “moments” Ackerman pursues. Although the New Deal period
certainly represented a time in which Americans came to favor national control over the economy, then and in the coming years the
commitment to nationalized rights also grew. A decision like Gideon
133
v. Wainwright, guaranteeing counsel to felony defendants, might
have been unthinkable prior to the 1960s, but it was met by near134
universal acclaim when the Court decided the case in 1963.
No
constitutional “moment” sanctified Gideon; rather, it was the gradual
process of constitutional change that any theory of constitutional interpretation must recognize.
Ultimately, though, the most intriguing lesson one can draw from
an attempt to make sense of the Reconstruction Amendments is one
that, ironically, runs somewhat contrary to the entire thrust of the argument to this point. It rests in the important distinction between
understanding constitutional history and fashioning constitutional
law. Synthetic though it may be, the enterprise of forging constitutional law necessarily is backward-looking. Constitutional lawyers, as
opposed to constitutional historians, do not so much weave our history into a coherent whole as they work in reverse to reconstruct it
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See ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 147–48 (1964) (discussing how twenty-three
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into a “usable” past. Ackerman captures this in a vivid metaphor in
which the constitutional judges sit in the middle of a train, looking
backward over the passing terrain, making sense of it as it recedes in
the distance, while they decide cases.
In deciding constitutional cases—in making constitutional law—
the judges do not have the luxury of fitting every piece of the puzzle,
for the very reason that some pieces simply will not fit. They must
decide what can be coherently integrated, and what must be rejected
or explained away. In a sense they are like empiricists fitting a regression line to a serious of data points. The demands of precedent require that the line be fit, even though some of the data points will fall
far off it.
There is a difference, however, between this sort of line-fitting,
and a methodology that relentlessly seeks to draw a straight line between a foundational moment and the present. For all the reasons
set out here, the latter necessarily is artifice: it is impossible to move
directly from foundational moments to the present, or in reverse, ignoring all the inconvenient moments that have intervened. The
judge or scholar who seeks to synthetically develop constitutional history must take account of as many relevant points as possible. The
best understanding of the Constitution is one that integrates most of
what of constitutional significance has happened throughout American history. Assuredly there will be moments of sharp deviation that
cannot be accounted for fully. But because history is path dependent,
even those moments that seem most off the center line will have influenced other data points that do fit the story.
The Constitution we live daily is forged of experience. “[W]hen
we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the
Constitution of the United States,” Justice Holmes explained in Missouri v. Holland, “we must realize that they have called into life a being
the development of which could not have been foreseen completely
135
by the most gifted of its begetters.”
Referring no doubt to the
events that gave rise to the Reconstruction Amendments, which
Holmes had witnessed first hand in the line of battle, he continued,
“It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created
an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors
136
much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation.” Thus,
he concluded, with far more wisdom than many interpreters today,
“The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole ex-
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perience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years
137
ago.”
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Id.

